I     (XA^Ca  »  ^  •  VJ    io  .-AaJ  (M)~i:L^r^\.jn^JC     (J  9 


UNIV.  OF  FU  LliS. 
PgCUMINTS  DEPI 


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U.S.  DEPOWTORY 


INTERSTATE  COMMERCE  COMMISSION. 


REPORT  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  THE  BUREAU  OF  SAFETY  IN  RE  INVES- 
TIGATION OF  AN  ACCIDENT  WHICH  OCCURRED  ON  THE  PHILADEL- 
PHIA &  READING  RAILWAY  NEAR  WOODMONT,  PA.,  ON  DECEMBER 
5,  1921. 

December  23,  1921. 
To  THE  Commission  : 

On  December  5,  1921,  there  was  a  head-end  collision  between  two 
passenger  trains  on  the  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Railway  near  Wood- 
mont,  Pa.,  which  resulted  in  the  death  of  20  passengers,  2  employees 
on  duty,  and  5  employees  off  duty,  and  injury  to  65  passengers  and 
5  employees.  This  accident  was  investigated  in  conjunction  with 
representatives  of  the  Public  Service  Commission  of  the  Common- 
wealth of  Pennsylvania, 

LOCATION  AND  METHOD  OF  OPERATION. 

This  accident  occurred  on  the  Newton  Branch  of  the  New  York 
Division.  This  branch  leads  off  from  the  double  track  of  the  New- 
York  iShort  Line  Branch  at  Cheltenham,  Pa.,  and  is  single  track  from 
Cheltenham  to  Newtown,  Pa.,  a  distance  of  16.6  miles.  The  move- 
ment of  trains  is  governed  by  time-table  and  train  orders,  eastbound 
trains  being  superior  by  direction.  In  addition  there  is  a  block  sys- 
tem, part  of  which  is  automatic  and  part  manual ;  from  Cheltenham 
eastward  to  Bryn  Athyn,  a  distance  of  5.4  miles,  the  automatic  block 
system  is  used,  the  signals  being  of  the  inclosed-disk  type,  while  from 
Brjn  Athyn  to  Newton,  the  end  of  the  line,  a  manual  block  sig- 
nal system  is  in  use.  There  are  two  telegraph  block  sections,  one 
from  Bryn  Athyn  to  Churchville,  a  distance  of  5.7  miles,  while  the 
other  is  from  Churchville  to  Newtown,  a  distance  of  5.5  miles.  Be- 
tween Bryn  Athyn  and  Churchville  there  is  an  intermediate  non- 
block  station,  Southampton,  where  trains  frequently  meet. 

The  first  station  west  of  Bryn  Athyn  is  Huntingdon  Valley,  0.7 
mile  distant.  At  this  station  there  are  two  automatic  block  signals, 
713  for  eastbound  trains  and  713-A  for  Avestbound  trains.  Bryn 
Athyn  station  is  located  on  the  south  side  of  the  track,  the  telegraph 
office  being  in  the  station.     Seventy-three  feet  east  of  the  telegraph 


32136—22- 


2  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

office,  and  also  located  on  the  south  side  of  the  track,  is  a  telegraph 
block  signal.  This  signal  is  a  two-position  semaphore  signal  of  the 
upper-quadrant  type,  having  one  arm;  it  governs  eastbound  trains 
only,  a  flag  being  used  when  there  are  train  orders  for  w^estbound 
trains.  About  515  feet  east  of  this  signal  is  the  point  of  a  switch  which 
leads  to  a  spur  track  extending  westward  paralleling  the  main  track 
on  the  south  and  ending  near  the  telegraph  block  signal ;  this  track 
was  used  as  a  passing  siding.  One  hundred  and  seventy  feet  east 
of  the  point  of  the  switch  is  located  automatic  bJock  signal  TIG,  which 
is  the  first  of  the  automatic  block  signals  governing  westbound  trains. 
The  track  circuit  controlling  signal  713  begins  at  a  point  about  1,500 
feet  east  of  signal  716.  Between  the  point  of  the  switch  and  signal 
716,  the  track  passes  over  a  steel  bridge  about  50  feet  in  length,  span- 
ning a  small  stream.  Beginning  at  Bryn  Athyn  station  and  proceed- 
ing eastward,  there  is  a  ^-degree  curve  to  the  left  which  extends  to 
the  point  of  the  switch.  From  the  point  of  the  switch  eastward  the 
line  is  tangent  for  a  considerable  distance.  Trees  located  on  the 
north  side  of  the  right  of  way  obstruct  the  view  of  signal  716  from 
Bryn  Athyn  station. 

The  point  of  collision  was  about  1.3  miles  east  of  Bryn  Athyn,  and 
0.8  mile  west  of  Woodmont ;  it  occurred  in  the  middle  of  a  rock  cut 
about  200  feet  in  length  and  having  a  maximum  depth  of  30  feet. 
The  cut  is  located  on  a  compound  curve  to  the  south  about  1,000 
feet  in  length,  having  a  maximum  curvature  of  7  degrees.  On  ac- 
count of  this  curve  and  cut,  the  range  of  vision  was  much  restricted, 
and  there  was  little  opportunity  for  either  engineman  to  see  the 
opposing  train.  The  Aveather  was  clear  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
which  occurred  at  about  7.55  a.  m. 

DESCRIPTION. 

Westbound  passenger  and  milk  train  Xo.  154,  en  route  from  New- 
town to  Philadelphia,  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Stout  and  Engine- 
man  F.  Eook,  and  consisted  of  engine  265  and  5  cars.  It  left  New- 
town at  6.50  a.  m.,  arrived  at  Churchville  at  7.06  a.  m.,  departed  at 
7.12  a.  m.,  5  minutes  late,  and  arrived  at  signal  716  at  7.28  a.  m.  The 
train  was  brought  to  a  stop  at  signal  716.  because  it  did  not  have  suffi- 
cient time  to  make  Huntingdon  Valley,  its  time-table  meeting  point, 
for  superior  train  No.  151,  also  because  signal  716  was  in  the  stop  po- 
sition. A  flagman  Avas  sent  ahead  and  after  a  fcAv  minutes,  the  train 
folloAving  him,  pulled  doAvn  to  Bryn  Athyn  station  and  unloaded 
passengers.  While  at  the  station  the  crcAv  received  form  ID  train 
order  No.  9,  reading  as  foUoAvs: 

Disregard  signal  716  and  run  carefully.    Complete  7.31  a.  ni. 

After  discharging  passengers  and  receiving  the  train  order,  a 
flagman  Avas  sent  back,  and  train  No.  154  backed  up  to  a  point  about 


5.5mi. 


O.ami, 


O.Smi 


Signal  713-A 

0 


Newtown  (Block  Station) 


ChurchviUe  (Block  Station) 
Southampton 

Woodmont 

Point  ot  Accident 

Paper  Mills 

Signal  716 
Point  ot  Switch 
Spur  Track 


Manual  Block  Signal 
ByrnAthyn  (Block  Station) 


Huntingdon  VaUeyjSignal  713 


Not  to  Scale. 


DIAGRAM    SHOWING    RELATIVE    LOCATION    OF    STATIONS,    SIGNALS,    ETC. 
TO    POINT    OF     ACCIDENT. 


Digitized  by  Vr\e  Internet  Arclnive 

in  2012  witln  funding  from 

University  of  Florida,  George  A.  Smathers  Libraries  with  support  from  LYRASIS  and  the  Sloan  Foundation 


http://www.archive.org/details/reportofchiefi1921t 


ACCIDENT  NEAR  WOODMONT,   PA.  3 

100  feet  east  of  signal  716  in  order  that  train  No.  151,  upon  arrival, 
might  pull  up  and  back  into  the  spur  track  to  meet  train  No.  154, 
the  track  not  being  long  enough  to  hold  the  latter  train.  After 
train  No.  151  had  arrived  and  backed  in  on  the  spur  track,  train  No. 
154  proceeded  and  passed  Bryn  Athyn  station  without  stopping,  ac- 
cording to  Operator  Clayton's  block  record,  at  7.4G  a.  m. ;  the  dis- 
patcher's train  sheet,  however,  showed  the  train  departing  at  7.44 
a.  m.,  this  time  having  been  changed  from  7.54  a.  m. 

Westbound  passenger  train  No.  156,  en  route  from  Newtown  to 
Philadelphia,  in  charge  of  Conductor  Smith  and  Engineman  J. 
Rook,  was  made  up  in  the  following  order:  Engine  278,  coaches  833, 
925,  1026,  and  970,  and  combination  coach  and  baggage  car  490,  all 
of  wooden  construction.  The  train  left  Newtown  at  7.30  a.  m. 
and  at  7.41  a.  m.  arrived  at  Churchville,  where  the  manual  block 
signal  was  in  the  stop  position.  The  conductor  went  to  the  telegraph 
office  and  received  form  31  train  order  No.  11,  reading  as  follows: 

No.  151  will  meet  No.  156  at  Bryn  Athyn.  No.  151  take  siding.  Com- 
plete 7.44  a.  m. 

The  conductor  delivered  a  copy  of  the  order  to  the  engineman, 
who  read  it;  the  block  signal  was  cleared  and  the  train  departed, 
as  shown  by  the  records,  at  7.45  a.  m.  It  passed  Woodmont  and 
while  running  at  a  speed  estimated  to  have  been  between  30  and  35 
miles  an  hour  it  collided  with  eastbound  train  No.  151. 

Eastbound  passenger  train  No.  151,  en  route  from  Philadelphia 
to  Newtown,  was  in  charge  of  Conductor  Evans  and  Engineman 
Yeakel.  It  was  hauled  by  engine  167  and  consisted  of  combination 
baggage  and  passenger  car  489,  of  wooden  construction,  and  coaches 
1093  and  1071,  of  steel-underframe  construction.  It  left  Philadel- 
phia at  6.48  a.  m.,  and  passed  Fox  Chase,  3.3  miles  west  of  Hunting- 
don Valley,  at  7.20  a.  m.,  on  time.  At  Huntingdon  Valley,  a  non- 
telegraph  station  and  its  time-table  meeting  point  with  train  No.  154, 
it  found  automatic  block  signal  713  in  the  stop  position.  A  flag- 
man was  sent  ahead  and  after  waiting  a  few  minutes  the  train  fol- 
lowed him  to  Bryn  Athyn,  arriving,  the  train  sheet  record  shows,  at 
7.42  a.  m.  Upon  arrival  at  Bryn  Athyn  the  telegraph  block  signal 
was  found  in  stop  position,  while  train  No.  154  was  standing  on  the 
main  track  east  of  signal  716.  Conductor  Evans  sent  word  to  his 
engineman  to  pull  up  and  back  in  on  the  siding,  but  the  engineman 
insisted  that  they  get  an  order  to  do  so.  Conductor  Evans  went  to 
the  telegraph  office  and  receiA'ed  form  31  train  order  No.  11,  read- 
ing as  follows : 

No.  151  will  meet  No.  156  at  Bryn  Atbyn.  No.  151  take  siding.  Complete 
7.46  a.  m. 

After  receiving  the  train  order.  Conductor  Evans  returned  to  his 
train  and  delivered  a  copy  of  the  order  to  the  engineman,  while  the 


4  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

oj^erator  came  out  on  the  platform  and  assisted  in  handling  bag- 
gage; the  train  then  pulled  ahead  under  flag  protection  and  backed 
in  on  the  siding.  AVhen  the  switch  was  closed,  train  Xo.  154  de- 
parted; then  the  switch  was  again  opened  and  train  No.  151  pulled 
out,  dejiarting,  as  shoAvn  by  the  records,  at  7.46  a.  m.  A  stop  was 
made  at  Paper  Mills  station,  0.7  mile  east  of  Bryn  Athjm,  to  let  off 
some  trackmen,  after  which  the  train  proceeded  and  had  gone  about 
0.5  mile  when,  while  running  at  a  speed  estimated  to  have  been  25 
or  30  miles  an  hour,  it  collided  with  train  No.  156. 

The  impact  forced  both  engines  upward,  engine  167,  of  train  No. 
151,  coming  to  rest  bottom  up,  headed  west  and  on  top  of  its  own 
tender,  while  engine  278,  of  train  No.  156,  was  on  top  of  engine  167. 
The  combination  car  of  train  No.  151  was  partially  telescoped  by  the 
tender  of  engine  167.  The  forward  end  of  the  second  car  of  train  No. 
151  was  also  partially  telescoped  by  the  rear  of  the  combination  car, 
while  the  rear  car  remained  on  the  rails  and  was  only  slightly  dam- 
aged. The  first  coach  of  train  No.  156  was  completely  telescoped  by 
the  tender  of  engine  278.  The  next  car  was  partially  telescoped  at  its 
forward  end  by  the  wreckage,  while  the  rear  truck  remained  on  the 
rails.  The  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  cars  of  train  No.  156  Avere  practi- 
cally undamaged  by  the  collision.  The  wreckage  took  fire  immedi- 
ately, the  first  car  of  each  train  being  completely  destroyed.  The  fire 
spread  quickly  and  destroyed  the  superstructures  of  the  second  and 
third  coaches  of  train  No.  156  and  of  the  second  coach  of  train  No. 
151.  It  is  probable  that  many  of  the  deaths  were  the  result  of  the 
fire  that  followed  the  collision.  The  employees  on  duty  killed  were 
the  firemen  of  each  train. 

SUMMARY  OF  EVIDENCE. 

Conductor  Evans,  of  train  No.  151,  stated  that  upon  arrival  at 
Bryn  Athyn  he  w^ent  to  the  telegraph  office  and  signed  and  received 
train  order  No.  11.  He  read  it  in  a  low  tone  of  voice  and  was  under 
the  impression  that  it  was  an  order  to  meet  train  No.  154  at  Biyn 
Athyn.  After  receiving  the  order  he  walked  to  the  engine  and 
delivered  a  copy  of  it  to  the  engineman,  neither  of  them  reading  it 
to  the  other  or  making  any  comment  whatever.  His  train  then  pulled 
down  and  backed  in  on  the  siding;  after  train  No.  154  had  departed 
the  switch  was  opened,  the  train  pulled  out  of  the  siding  and  pro- 
ceeded without  a  clearance  card  or  other  permission  from  the  operator 
at  Bryn  Athyn,  although  the  block  signal  was  in  the  stop  position. 
He  stated  it  was  his  understanding  that  a  train  order  was  sufficient 
authoiity  for  a  train  to  pass  a  block  or  train-order  signal  in  the 
stop  position  Avithoiit  a  clearance  card.  He  did  not  show  his  copy 
of  the  train  order  to  his  trainmen,  as  they  were  both  attending  to  the 


ACCIDENT    NEAR    WOODMONT,    PA.  5 

switches  at  tlie  time,  l)ut  he  put  it  uiidei-  (lie  bii<;gagemaster's  box  in 
the  ba<!:o:age  car,  as  was  his  eustoni,  so  that  the  ba*^gagemaster  mij^^ht 
see  it. 

P2n<rineman  Yeakel  stated  that  when  Conductor  Evans  handed  him 
the  order  he  <»;lanced  at  it  and  ^ot  the  imi)ressi()n  that  it  was  an  order 
to  meet  train  No.  15-1:  at  Bryn  Athyn.  He  hekl  the  order  in  his  hand 
until  hia  train  was  in  on  the  sidin<r:  hiter  he  put  it  into  his  pocket. 
He  saw  the  opposin*!;  train  just  as  the  collision  <)cciirre(*l,  l)nt  did  not 
have  time  to  api)ly  the  brakes. 

The  statements  made  by  Operator  Clayton,  on  duty  at  Bryn 
xVthyn,  are  conflictinij:  and  vacillatino;.  He  stated  that  when  train 
No.  151  arrived  at  Brj'n  Athyn  the  conductor  came  into  the  tele- 
graph office  and  signed  train  order  No.  11.  He  transmitted  the 
signature  to  the  train  dispatcher,  received  ''complete"  from  him  at 
7.4G  a.  m.,  and  delivered  the  order  to  Conductor  Evans,  who  read  it 
to  himself;  Operator  Clayton  said  he  overheard  him  read  it  and  said 
he  read  it  correctly.  FolloAving  this.  Operator  Clayton  went  out 
on  the  platform  and  assisted  in  unloading  baggage  from  train  No. 
151.  Operator  Clayton's  first  statement  was  to  the  effect  that  lie 
did  not  report  train  No.  154  clear  of  the  block  to  (^hurchville  and 
that  the  operator  at  Church ville  did  not  secure  his  permission  to  let 
train  No.  156  enter  the  block.  He  also  stated  it  was  his  understand- 
ing that  the  block  Avas  between  Bryn  Athyn  and  Churchville.  ITpon 
subsequent  examination,  however,  Operator  Clayton  stated  that  he 
cleared  the  block  to  Churchville  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  train  No.  154 
had  crossed  the  bridge  just  west  of  signal  716  and  that  he  gave  the 
operator  at  Churchville  permission  to  let  train  No.  156  proceed  on 
a  clear  block,  considering  that  the  block  for  westbound  trains  ended 
at  automatic  signal  716.  After  train  No.  154  had  departed,  he 
went  out  on  the  station  platform  to  bring  in  a  flag  which  he  had 
used  for  a  train-order  signal,  and  it  was  at  that  time  he  discovered 
train  No.  151  pulling  out  of  the  siding.  He  made  an  effort  to  signal 
the  train  to  stop  but  was  unsuccessful.  Operator  Clayton  stated  that 
had  he  waited  until  the  rear  of  train  No,  154  had  actually  passed  his 
station  before  clearing  the  block  to  Churchville,  he  would  probably 
have  discovered  that  train  No.  151  had  departed  contrary  to  their 
orders,  and  would  then  have  refused  to  give  the  block  to  the  operator 
at  Churchville  for  train  No.  156  to  proceed  and  thus  would  have 
prevented  the  accident.  The  block  record  at  Bryn  Athyn  clearly 
indicates  that  the  entries  relative  to  trains  Nos.  151  and  154  had 
been  altered.  Operator  Clayton  was  unable  to  explain  these  altera- 
tions except  on  the  ground  that  he  was  busy  selling  tickets  at  the 
time  and  that  the  entries  were  not  made  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence 
but  from*memorv  about  an  hour  afterwards,  at  which  time  he  was 
verv  much  excited  and  disturbed. 


6  INTERSTATE   COMMEECE   COMMISSION. 

Operator  Tomlinson,  on  duty  at  Churchville,  also  made  statements 
on  two  occasions  which  are  conflicting.  In  his  first  statement  Opera- 
tor Tomlinson  said  he  permitted  train  No.  156  to  proceed  from  his 
station,  giving  them  a  clear  block  signal,  and  at  that  time  train  No. 
154  had  not  been  actually  cleared  of  the  block  by  the  operator  at 
Bryn  Athyn,  but  that  he  had  an  understanding  with  the  operator  at 
Bryn  Athyn  that  train  No.  154  stood  at  Bryn  Athj^n  station  ready 
to  go.  On  the  second  occasion.  Operator  Tomlinson  stated  that  upon 
the  arrival  of  train  No.  156  the  conductor  came  to  the  office  and 
signed  train  order  No.  11,  and  that  he  transmitted  the  signature  to 
the  train  dispatcher  and  received  "  complete  "  from  him  at  7.44  a.  m. 
He  immediately  communicated  with  the  operator  at  Bryn  Athyn  and 
ascertained  that  train  No.  154  was  clear  of  the  block  at  Bryn  Athyn ; 
the  conductor  of  train  No.  156  left  the  telegraph  office,  went  to  the 
engine  and  delivered  a  copy  of  the  order  to  the  engineman;  while 
thus  engaged,  Operator  Tomlinson  cleared  the  train-order  signal  and 
the  train  departed  immediately. 

At  the  investigation  Operator  Tomlinson  produced  a  record  which 
he  identified  as  the  original  block  record  kept  at  his  station.  This 
record  showed  that  train  No.  154  cleared  the  block  at  Bryn 
Athyn  at  7.45  a.  m. ;  the  figure  "  5,"  however,  bore  indications 
of  alteration  and,  upon  questioning.  Operator  Tomlinson  ad- 
mitted that  he  had  changed  the  clearing  time  from  7.46  a.  m. 
to  7.45  a.  m.  for  the  purpose  of  makng  the  record  7.45  a.  m.  on 
the  book.  The  block  record  produced  by  Operator  Tomlinson 
was  contained  in  a  new  record  book,  the  first  entry  being  for 
December  1.  Operator  Tomlinson  was  later  required  to  produce 
the  book  containing  the  record  previous  to  December  1,  and  upon 
examination  of  that  record  it  was  apparent  that  several  pages  of 
the  book  subsequent  to  November  30  had  been  removed.  In  the  old 
record  book  only  three  columns  were  filled  in,  the  train  number,  and 
the  arriving  and  departing  time  of  trains,  while  in  the  new  book  the 
columns  headed  "  Train  No.,"  "  Signals  displayed,"  "  Entered  block 
in  rear,"  "Arrived,"  "  Entered  block,"  "  Reported  to  block  station 
in  advance,"  "  Clear  block  reported  to  station  in  rear,"  and  "Advance 
block  reported  clear,"  were  all  filled  in.  Upon  further  examination, 
Operator  Tomlinson  admitted  that  the  book  which  he  had  identified 
during  his  previous  examination  as  the  original  record  was  not  the 
original,  but  a  copy  which  he  made  for  the  purpose  of  this  investiga- 
tion, and  that  the  copy  contained  additional  information  not  shown 
by  the  original  record  and  that  the  original  record  had  been  de- 
stroyed by  him.  He  assumed  full  responsibility  for  making  these 
cKangea  and  for  destroying  the  original  record,  stating  that  he  acted 
entirely  upon  his  own  initiative  and  without  suggestion  or  instruc- 
tion from  any  person.     Operator  Tomlinson  stated  that  his  office 


ACCIDKNT    NKAR   WOODMONT,    PA.  7 

was  closed  when  standard  time  was  transmitted  by  telegraph  and 
as  a  result  he  seldom  received  standard  time;  he  did  occasionally 
compare  his  watch  with  trainmen  Avho  had  standard  time.  He  was 
unable  to  say  whether  his  watch  was  correct  on  the  day  of  the 
accident. 

Conductor  Stout,  of  train  No.  154,  stated  that  his  train  passed 
Bryn  Athyn  station  at  about  7.48  a.  m.  He  also  stated  it  was  his 
understanding  that  the  block  for  westbound  trains  ended  at  Bryn 
Athyn  station.  However,  upon  cross-examination  by  General  Super- 
intendent Fisher,  he  retracted  this  statement  and  said  the  block 
ended  at  signal  716.  Engineman  F.  Rook,  of  train  No.  154,  stated 
it  was  his  understanding  that  the  rear  of  a  westbound  train  would 
have  to  pass  Bryn  Athyn  station  before  the  block  could  properly  be 
cleared  to  Churchville. 

Engineman  J.  Rook,  of  train  No.  156,  stated  that  the  block  signal 
at  Churchville  was  cleared  as  the  conductor  was  walking  down  the 
platform  with  the  train  order.  He  did  not  recall  the  time  his  train 
left  Churchville,  but  said  it  passed  Southampton  3  minutes  late. 
This  would  make  train  No.  156  passing  Southampton  at  7.49  a.  m. ; 
the  schedule  time  from  Churchville  to  Southampton  is  5  minutes, 
which  would  make  train  No.  156  departing  from  Churchville  at  7.44 
a.  m.  Engineman  Rook  also  stated  that  when  he  receives  a  clear 
block  signal  at  Churchville  he  understands  that  the  block  is  clear 
to  Bryn  Athyn  station  and  not  to  signal  716  only.  He  stated  that 
he  saw  the  engine  of  train  No.  151  when  it  was  about  40  feet  distant 
and  that  he  made  an  application  of  the  brakes  just  before  the  col- 
lision occurred. 

Brakeman  Fulmore,  of  train  No.  156,  stated  that  when  his  train 
Avas  leaving  Churchville  he  looked  at  his  watch  and  it  was  then  be- 
tween 7.45  a.  m.  and  7.46  a.  m. 

Train  Dispatcher  Rich  stated  that  when  train  No.  154  arrived  at 
Bryn  Athyn  the  conductor  reported  signal  716  in  the  stop  position. 
At  that  time  one  of  his  telegraph  wires  was  in  trouble  east  of  New 
York  Branch  Crossing,  and  from  this  he  concluded  that  the  entire 
signal  circuit  from  signal  716  to  Huntingdon  Valley  was  out  of 
order,  and  to  avoid  delay  to  train  No.  156  which  would  result  from 
train  No.  154  being  required  to  flag  to  Huntingdon  Valley,  he  issued 
train  order  No.  9,  for  train  No.  154  to  disregard  signal  716.  He  ad- 
mitted, however,  that  this  signal  condition  might  arise  with  train 
No.  151  occupying  the  track  circuit  between  signals  713  and  716; 
also  if  train  No.  154  entered  the  track  circuit  east  of  signal  716  and 
was  unable  to  proceed  farther  than  Bryn  Athyn  on  account  of  time- 
table inferiority,  it  Avould  be  necessary  for  train  No.  151  to  flag  from 
Huntingdon  Valley  to  Bryn  Athyn. 
S2186— 22 2 


8  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

Signal  Supervisor  Steele  stated  that  on  the  morning  of  December 
5,  signal  716  was  reported  as  being  out  of  order,  but  inspection  by  the 
signal  maintainer  disclosed  no  trouble  and  that  the  signal  was  work- 
ing properly. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

This  accident  was  caused  by  the  failure  of  Conductor  Evans  and 
Engineman  Yeakel,  of  train  No.  151,  to  obey  train  order  No.  11, 
directing  them  to  meet  train  No.  156  at  Bryn  Athyn ;  also  by  their 
failure  to  observe  manual  block-signal  rules  in  leaving  Bryn  Athyn 
with  the  block  signal  in  the  stop  position  without  securing  a  clearance 
card.  Contributing  to  this  was  the  failure  of  the  operator  at  either 
Bryn  Athyn  or  Churchville,  or  both,  properly  to  operate  the  manual 
block  system. 

It  is  probable  that  the  failure  on  the  part  of  Conductor  Evans  and 
Engineman  Yeakel  to  obey  the  instructions  contained  in  train  order 
No.  11  was  caused  by  their  anticipating  the  contents  of  the  order 
and  acting  upon  that  impression  rather  than  upon  the  instructions 
contained  in  the  order.  The  evidence  indicates  that  when  Engineman 
Yeakel  was  requested  to  pull  up  and  back  in  on  the  siding,  he  would 
not  do  so  until  he  received  an  order  directing  him  to  make  the  move- 
ment, and  when  he  did  receive  the  train  order  he  assumed  that  tlie 
order  was  the  one  which  he  had  requested.  General  operating  rule 
210,  with  reference  to  train  ordere,  reads  in  part : 

The  copy  for  each  engineman  must  be  delivered  to  him  personally  by  the  con- 
ductor or  pilot,  and  the  engineman  must  read  it  aloud  to  the  person  delivering  it. 

General  Instructions,  Rules  for  Conductors,  rule  1003,  reads  in 
part: 

On  passenger  trains  they  will  show  all  orders  to  trainmen.     *     *     * 

Had  Conductor  Evans  and  Engineman  Yeakel  complied  with  these 
rules,  their  mistake  would  undoubtedly  have  been  discovered.  This 
accident  again  calls  attention  to  the  fallability  of  the  human  element 
and  emphasizes  the  inherent  danger  in  the  operation  of  trains  by 
the  train-order  system. 

It  was  no  oversight  on  the  part  of  Conductor  Evans  that  train 
No,  151  left  Bryn  Athyn  without  a  clearance  card  on  the  block  sig- 
nal. According  to  his  understanding  of  the  rules  the  train  order 
he  had  received  gave  his  train  the  right  to  proceed  without  a  clearance 
card  with  the  block  signal  in  the  stop  position.  If  he  had  had  a 
proper  understanding  of  the  rules,  immediatelj^  after  the  passage  of 
train  No.  154  he  would  have  ascertained  the  condition  of  the  block 
and  thus  would  have  been  checked  on  the  misreading  of  the  train 
order. 

The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  train  No.  156  left  Churchville  on 
a  clear  block  signal  when  train  No.  154  still  stood  on  the  main  track 


AC'CinENT    NEAR   WOODMONT,    PA.  9 

at  signal  716  with  the  roar  of  its  train  east  of  the  signal.  Train  No. 
151  received  "  complete  "  to  train  order  No.  11  at  7.46  a.  m.,  after 
which  they  handled  baggage,  pulled  up  and  backed  in  on  the  siding 
before  train  No.  154  could  even  pass  signal  716;  the  order  to  train 
No.  156  was  completed  at  7.44  a.  m.  and  the  train  departed  from 
Churchville  shortl}'  thereafter.  There  can  be  no  dispute  as  to  the 
time  the  orders  were  completed  by  the  train  dispatcher,  as  both 
times  were  taken  from  the  same  clock. 

The  statements  of  Operators  Clayton  and  Tomlinson  are  so  con- 
flicting and  the  condition  of  their  block  records  such  that  state- 
ments made  by  thorn  are  of  little  if  nnj  value.  In  view  of  these  con- 
flicting statements  it  is  impossible  to  determine  whether  the  operator 
at  Bryn  Ath3^n  cleared  the  block  to  Churchville  before  the  operator 
at  Churchville  permitted  train  No.  156  to  proceed  on  a  clear  block,  or 
whether  the  operator  at  Bryn  Athyn  did  not  clear  the  block  and  the 
operator  at  Churchville  let  train  No.  156  go  on  a  clear  block  signal, 
knowing  that  the  block  was  still  occupied  by  train  No.  154. 

The  investigation  of  this  accident  disclosed  that  in  this  instance 
all  of  the  safeguards  provided  for  the  operation  of  trains  were 
rendered  ineffective  by  errors  on  the  part  of  employees  involved, 
misunderstanding  of  operating  rules,  and  improper  practices  which 
had  grown  up  in  service. 

The  train-order  system  failed  due  to  the  members  of  the  train 
crew  of  train  No.  151  misreading  or  neglecting  to  read  the  train 
order  establishing  the  meeting  point. 

The  manual  block-signal  system  failed,  due  to  the  crew  of  train 
No.  151  departing  from  Bryn  Athj'n  without  authority  when  the 
signal  was  at  stop,  and  due  to  train  No.  156  being  admitted  to  the 
block  under  a  clear  signal  when  the  block  was  occupied. 

In  addition  to  the  specific  failures  of  the  block  system  which  led 
directly  to  this  accident,  investigation  disclosed  a  general  laxity  in 
the  observation  of  block  signal  rules.  General  rule  317-B,  which 
jjrescribes  the  method  of  blocking  trains,  is  followed  by  this  note : 

Note. — 317-B  is  for  absolute  block  for  opposing  movements  and  permissive 
block  for  following  movements  on  the  same  track. 

Notwithstanding  the  requirement  that  a  positive  block  must  be 
maintained  for  opposing  trains,  the  time-table  provides  for  regular 
meeting  points  between  schedule  trains  at  Southampton,  an  inter- 
mediate nonblock  station  located  in  the  block  section  between  Bryn 
Athyn  and  Churchville,  and  opposing  trains  are  permitted  to  enter 
the  block  on  a  clearance  or  a  caution  card. 

Eule  317-B  also  reads  in  part : 

A  train  must  not  be  admitted  to  a  block  which  is  occupied  by  a  passenger 
train,  except  as  provided  in  Rule  331,  or  by  special  order. 


10  INTERSTATE   COMMERCE   COMMISSION. 

(Kule  331  provides  for  movement  in  case  of  failure  of  telegraph 
line.) 

Train  Dispatcher  Rich  stated  it  was  his  understanding  that  train 
No.  156  might  enter  the  block  at  Churchville  with  train  No.  154  still 
within  the  block,  provided  train  No.  156  received  a  caution  card. 

The  incomplete  condition  of  the  block  records  at  both  Churchville 
and  Bryn  Athyn,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  time  was  not  entered 
on  the  record  at  Bryn  Athyn  until  an  hour  after,  are  further  evidence 
of  the  loose  method  of  operating  the  manual  block-signal  system. 

Circular  No.  403,  dated  May  21,  1914,  putting  the  block  system 
into  effect  in  this  territory,  provides  that  "  Manual  telegraph  block 
system  will  be  in  operation  between  Brjai  Athyn  and  Newtown." 
It  also  provides  that  this  telegraph  block  sj'^stem  is  in  effect  at — 

Bryn   Athyn 6.30  a.  ni.  to  7.20  p.  m. 

Churchville 6.15  a.m.  to  2.35  p.m. 

And 3.35  p.m.  to  7.35  p.m. 

Newtown . 6.00  a.m.  to  2.35  p.m. 

And 3.35  p.m.  to  7.35  p.m. 

It  further  provides  that  "  In  forwarding  trains  signalmen  will  be 
governed  by  rule  317-B."  Under  this  circular  it  appears  that  the 
manual  block  section  for  eastbound  trains  begins,  and  for  westbound 
trains  ends,  at  Bryn  Athyn  station,  and  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained 
in  that  respect  has  not  been  subsequently  modified,  and  w\as  so  under- 
stood by  the  employees  generally  at  the  time  of  the  accident.  Not- 
withstanding this,  it  is  claimed  by  officials  of  the  Philadelphia  & 
Reading  Railway  that  while  the  manual  block  section  for  eastbound 
trains  begins  at  Bryn  Athyn  station,  the  manual  block  section  for 
westbound  trains  ends  at  signal  716,  some  750  feet  east  of  the  station, 
and  that  it  is  proper  for  the  operator  at  Bryn  Athyn  to  clear  the 
block  to  Churchville  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  a  westbound  train  has 
passed  signal  716. 

There  was  no  uniform  or  clear  understanding  as  to  whether  the 
siding  at  Bryn  Athyn  was  within  the  limits  of  Bryn  Athyn  station 
or  whether  it  was  within  the  block  section  between  Bryn  Athyn  and 
Churchville,  and  w^hether  or  not  it  was  necessary  for  train  No.  151 
to  have  a  clearance  or  a  caution  card  before  passing  the  block  signal 
to  back  into  the  siding. 

Conductor  Evans  was  under  the  impression  that  a  train  order 
alone  was  sufficient  authority  for  a  train  to  pass  a  train-order  signal 
or  a  block  signal  in  the  stop  position. 

The  train-order  signal  at  Bryn  Athyn  is  not  clearly  defined,  and 
the  evidence  is  conflicting  as  to  whether  a  flag  should  be  used  for 
eastbound  trains  or  whether  the  block  signal  should  be  us?d. 

Train  No.  154  was  given  a  train  order  to  disregard  signal  716 
upon  the  assumption  of  the  train  dispatcher  that  the  signal  was  out 


ACCIDENT    NEAR   WOODMONT,    PA.  11 

of  order,  when  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  properly  indicated  there  was 
a  train  in  the  block.  This  order  created  a  dangerous  situation,  and 
was  given  apparently  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  avoid  delaying 
train  movements.  A  similar  order  was  also  issued  to  train  No. 
156,  but  was  not  delivered. 

There  does  not  appear  to  have  been  any  system  that  required 
employees  to  be  reexamined  on  the  rules  at  regular  intervals;  some 
of  them  liad  not  been  examined  since  1914,  and  the  train  dispatcher 
involved  had  never  been  examined. 

The  investigation  disclosed  extremely  lax  supervision  by  respon- 
sible officers  over  the  conduct  of  employees  in  the  observance  of 
ordinary  safeguards  to  train  movement.  There  was  no  system  of 
instruction  of  emploj'ees  to  provide  a  correct  and  uniform  under- 
standing of  the  rules,  nor  any  effort  on  the  part  of  responsible  officers 
to  correct  existing  operating  practices  which  were  contrary  to  rules 
and  a  constant  menace  to  the  traveling  public.  The  laxity  with 
which  the  manual  block  system  was  operated  on  this  line  is  a  condi- 
tion which  could  have  been  easily  discovered  had  any  attempt  been 
made  by  officials  to  check  it  up. 

The  practice  of  authorizing  trains  to  disregard  automatic  signal 
indications  frequently  upon  trivial  occasions  merely  to  preA'ent  delay, 
is  dangerous,  tends  to  lead  to  a  disrespect  of  all  automatic  block 
signals,  and  can  not  be  too  strongly  condemned. 

The  manual  telegraph  block  system  between  Bryn  Athyn  and 
Churchville  is  in  effect  only  during  the  daytime,  and  this  is  tempo- 
rarily suspended  at  Churchville  and  Newtown  from  2.35  p.  m.  until 
3.35  p.  m.  each  day.  An  analysis  of  the  train  movements  between 
Bryn  Athyn  and  Newtown  for  the  months  of  August  to  November, 
inclusive,  indicates  an  average  daily  movement  of  17  passenger  trains 
and  1.7  other  trains.  The  manual  block  system  which  is  nominally 
in  effect  on  this  line  is  entirely  inadequate,  in  view  of  practices  dis- 
closed by  this  investigation,  to  furnish  the  required  protection;  and 
while  not  involved  in  this  accident  the  order  issued  by  the  dispatcher 
nullified  the  protection  which  automatic  signal  716  was  intended  to 
furnish. 

To  prevent  the  recurrence  of  accidents  of  this  character  it  is 
recommended  that  measures  be  taken  promptly  by  the  carrier  to 
insure  that  emploj'ees  properly  understand  and  obey  operating  rules 
which  are  provided  to  safeguard  train  operation,  and  that  the  car- 
rier be  required  to  install  on  this  line  a  complete  automatic  train- 
control  system. 

All  of  the  cars  involved  in  the  accident  except  the  two  last  cars  of 
train  No.  151  were  of  wooden  construction  and  were  equipped  with 
the  Pintsch  gas  lighting  system.  It  is  probable  that  many  of  the 
lives  lost  in  this  accident  were  the  result  of  the  fire  which  followed 


12  INTERSTATE    COMMERCE    COMMISSION. 

the  collision.  There  is  no  direct  evidence  that  the  fire  was  aggra- 
vated by  the  Pintsch  gas  which  was  present  in  the  cars,  although  it 
is  Dossible  that  such  was  the  case. 

Had  all-steel  equipment  been  in  service  on  these  trains,  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  casualties  resulting  from  the  fire  would  have  been  pre- 
vented and  those  resulting  from  the  collision  would  have  been  much 
lessened.  At  the  present  time,  the  passenger-car  equipment  of  the 
Philadelphia  &  Reading  Railway  consists  of  205  all-steel  cars,  90  with 
steel  underframes,  289  wooden  cars  in  actual  service  and  217  wooden 
cars  surplus.  Officials  stated  it  is  their  policy  to  keep  the  steel  and 
steel-under  frame  cars  in  through  service,  while  wooden  cars  are  con- 
fined to  branch-line  service.  The  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Railway 
has  not  purchased  any  wooden  passenger  cars  for  a  number  of  years. 
Prior  to  the  war,  it  had  adopted  a  well-defined  program  for  the  pur- 
chase of  approximately  50  steel  cars  per  year,  but  this  program  was 
discontinued  during  the  war.  Since  then  it  is  stated  that  the  financial 
condition  of  the  railroad  has  been  such  as  not  to  enable  it  to  continue 
the  purchase  of  this  type  of  new  equipment.  At  the  present  time, 
however,  they  have  inquiries  out  for  additional  steel  equipment  which 
they  hope  to  purchase  in  the  near  future.  In  this  connection  it  seems 
not  improper  to  observe  that  a  considerable  financial  burden  has  been 
imposed  upon  the  railroad,  as  the  result  of  this  accident,  for  which 
no  return  is  possible.  The  amount  of  money  which  thus  will  be  ex- 
pended would  probably  have  enabled  the  railroad  to  continue  its 
prewar  j)rogram  for  the  purchase  of  steel  equipment,  as  well  as  to 
introduce  other  measures  of  safety  for  the  protection  of  the  traveling 
public.  That  steel  passenger  cars  afford  much  greater  protection  to 
the  traveling  public  has  been  repeatedly  demonstrated,  and  this  is 
particularly  true  when  the  danger  of  fire  is  considered ;  that  the  offi- 
cials of  the  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Railway  recognize  the  greater 
security  afforded  by  steel  equipment  is  apparent  by  their  own  state- 
ments. 

It  is  recommended  that  the  Philadelphia  &  Reading  Railway  at 
the  earliest  practicable  date  provide  steel  cars  for  carrying  pas- 
sengers, and  that  the  use  of  wooden  cars  ahead  of,  or  between  steel 
or  steel-underframe  cars,  in  passenger  trains,  be  discontinued. 

Conductor  Evans  entered  the  service  August  6,  1902,  as  a  switch- 
ing conductor,  was  promoted  to  passenger  conductor  in  1912,  passed 
examination  on  the  operating  rules  May  22,  1919,  and  at  the  time 
of  the  accident  had  been  on  duty  9  hours  17  minutes,  prior  to  which 
he  had  been  off  duty  over  12  hours. 

Engineman  Yeakel  entered  the  service  in  1898,  and  was  promoted 
to  passenger  engineman  in  1904.  There  is  no  record  of  his  last 
examination  on  operating  rules.     At  the  time  of  the  accident  he 


A(^CIDENT    XKAIl   WOODMOXT,    PA.  13 

had  been  on  duty  9  hours  47  minutes,  prior  to  Avhich  he  had  been 
off  duty  11  hours  43  minutes. 

Operator  CLayton  entered  the  service  as  station  agent  in  1902,  was 
examined  on  the  rules  in  1914,  and  at  the  time  of  the  accident  had 
been  on  duty  1  hour  25  minutes,  prior  to  which  he  was  off  duty  15 
hours. 

Operator  Tomlinson  entered  the  service  as  agent  in  1907,  was 
examined  on  tlie  operating  rules  in  1914,  and  at  the  time  of  the 
accident  he  had  been  on  duty  2  hours  40  minutes,  prior  to  which 
he  had  been  off  duty  15  hours. 

Eespectfully  submitted,  ' 

W.  P.  Borland, 
Chiefs  Bureau  of  Safety. 


WASHINGTON  :  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE  :  1922 


UNIVERSITY  OF  FLORIDA 


3  1262  08856  1690 


